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Note 
UNITED STATES EX REL. DRC, INC. V. CUSTER BATTLES, LLC: A 
BRUTAL BATTLE FORESHADOWING THE FUTURE OF FALSE 
CLAIMS ACT LITIGATION 
KATHLEEN H. HARNE* 
In United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC (DRC IV),1 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered 
whether a contractor was liable under the False Claims Act (―FCA‖) for 
submitting fraudulent claims to the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(―CPA‖) in Iraq.2  The court, reversing in part and remanding the lower 
court‘s decision, held that all of the fraudulent claims presented by the 
contractor, including those paid out of the Development Fund for Iraq 
(―DFI‖), qualified under the FCA for two primary reasons.3  First, the 
United States had contributed a portion of funds that became part of the 
DFI, a source of funds belonging to the Iraqi people.4  Second, a jury could 
reasonably conclude that U.S. Government contracting officers assigned to 
the CPA constituted U.S. employees acting in their official capacity.5  In so 
holding, the Fourth Circuit erroneously ignored precedent by extending the 
FCA to claims where U.S. funds were absent.6  By neglecting to employ an 
instrumentality test, the court failed to recognize that the CPA was a non-
U.S. instrumentality whose employees could not implicate the FCA‘s 
presentment requirement.7  Finally, the Fourth Circuit distorted the 
restitutive purpose of the FCA.8   
If the Fourth Circuit had applied traditional FCA analysis, it would 
have avoided an alarming expansion of the FCA, thereby preventing 
contractor uncertainty and evading surrender to overarching U.S. political 
interests in a unique international situation.9  Moreover, the court would 
have provided less clout to Congress‘s subsequent approval of imprudent 
 
Copyright © 2010 by Kathleen H. Harne. 
* Kathleen H. Harne is a third-year law student and Maryland Law Review staff member at 
the University of Maryland School of Law.  She would like to thank all of the Maryland Law 
Review editors who continuously motivated her and assisted her in the drafting of this Note.  She 
would also like to thank her friends and family for their considerable support.   
 1. 562 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 2. Id. at 297.     
 3. Id. at 298, 305–06. 
 4. Id. at 304–05. 
 5. Id. at 308.   
 6. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 7. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 8. See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 9. See infra Part IV.A.1–C.1. 
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amendments to the FCA under the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 
2009 (―FERA‖).10  Instead, Custer Battles foreshadowed Congress‘s 
complete overhaul of the FCA through amendments that now destroy the 
vital nexus between the U.S. Government and the contractor,11 create 
limitless liability,12 and erode the FCA‘s original purpose of providing 
restitution to the U.S. Government.13   
I.  THE CASE  
On August 27, 2003, Custer Battles, LLC (―Custer Battles‖), a firm 
providing support services to governments engaged in global conflicts, 
entered into the Iraqi Currency Exchange (―ICE‖) contract with the CPA, a 
temporary entity that governed Iraq from May 2003 to June 2004.14  In an 
effort to replace Iraqi dinars, or the Iraqi currency, which bore the portrait 
of Saddam Hussein, the CPA contracted with Custer Battles to provide 
―security, construction, and operational services‖ to support the ICE 
contract.15  Agreeing to a time and materials contract, the CPA would 
reimburse Custer Battles for direct costs and would pay an extra twenty-five 
percent of these direct costs.16  The CPA initially provided Custer Battles 
with a $3 million advance with a U.S. Treasury check, which comprised a 
 
 10. See infra Part IV.A.2–C.2. 
 11. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 12. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 13. See infra Part IV.C.2.  
 14. United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC (DRC I), 376 F. Supp. 2d 617, 619, 
623, 631 (E.D. Va. 2005), rev’d, 562 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2009).  The Fourth Circuit later referred to 
this contract as the ―Dinar Exchange Contract.‖  United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, 
LLC (DRC IV), 562 F.3d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 2009).  Custer Battles had also previously entered into 
a separate Baghdad International Airport Contract with the CPA in August 2003, which was a 
―firm-fixed price‖ contract in which Custer Battles received advances and monthly installments.  
DRC I, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 630.  On April 16, 2003, U.S. General Tommy R. Franks announced 
the formation of the CPA in his ―Freedom Message to the Iraqi People.‖  Id. at 620.  He stated that 
the CPA would ―‗exercise powers of government temporarily‘‖ and ―‗provide security, to allow 
the delivery of humanitarian aid and to eliminate the weapons of mass destruction.‘‖  Id.  In May 
2003, the U.N. Security Council, without establishing or creating the CPA, formally recognized its 
formation.  Id. at 621.  Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, officially appointed as the Presidential Envoy 
to Iraq without Senate confirmation, was later designated as the CPA‘s ―Administrator‖ by 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.  Id.  While most CPA officials were U.S. citizens, thirteen 
percent of them were from other Coalition member countries.  Id. at 623.  After the CPA‘s 
dissolution, the Interim Government of Iraq assumed governance until an elected Transitional 
Government of Iraq was established.  Id. 
 15. DRC I, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 619. 
 16. United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC (DRC II), 444 F. Supp. 2d 678, 680 
(E.D. Va. 2006), rev’d, 562 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2009).  Although the parties disputed the details of 
the ICE contract, the jury found these facts to be true regarding the ICE contract.  Id.   
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portion of the CPA‘s ―Seized Funds‖ of former Iraqi government sources.17  
Custer Battles received payment from the DFI for all subsequent invoices.18   
United States personnel detailed to work for the CPA received these 
invoices from Custer Battles, forwarded them to ―a U.S. retained contractor 
and U.S. Military personnel for approval,‖ and then eventually submitted 
them to the CPA‘s finance office for payment.19  The contract, excluding 
the advance, ultimately totaled $12 million.20  Throughout its performance, 
Custer Battles allegedly presented falsely inflated invoices to the CPA by 
listing fictional subcontractors, or ―shell companies,‖ as requiring 
additional payments.21  A few months later, Custer Battles‘s co-owner 
accidentally left behind a spreadsheet of invoices revealing these inflated 
amounts at a meeting with CPA officials.22  DRC, Inc., a subcontractor of 
Custer Battles, subsequently brought a qui tam suit as a relator under the 
FCA.23  The relator claimed that Custer Battles knowingly presented false 
claims to a U.S. government official under the ICE contract in violation of 
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1), and that it had knowingly made false records, or 
invoices, to ensure that the false claims under the contract would be paid in 
violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2).24   
 
 17. Id. at 683.  The Fourth Circuit later clarified that the advance was paid with a U.S. 
Treasury check.  DRC IV, 562 F.3d at 298.       
 18. DRC I, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 632.       
 19. DRC IV, 562 F.3d at 299.   
 20. DRC I, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 632.  
 21. Id. at 619.      
 22. DRC II, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 681. 
 23. Id. at 679–80.  At the time when both the district court and the Fourth Circuit ruled on 
Custer Battles, the FCA authorized ―private persons‖ to bring a civil action against a private entity 
that did the following:  
(1) knowingly present[ed], or cause[d] to be presented, to an officer or employee of the 
United States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States a 
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval; [or] (2) knowingly [made], use[d], or 
cause[d] to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent 
claim paid or approved by the Government.  
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006).  
 24. DRC II, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 679–80.  There were many defendants in this case.  Apart 
from Custer Battles, the defendants included Custer Battles‘s principals, various subsidiaries, and 
a former Custer Battles‘s employee.  Id. at 679 n.1.  William Baldwin, a former Custer Battles 
employee, also brought suit and claimed that Custer Battles retaliated against him in violation of 
31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) for whistle-blowing the contractor‘s fraudulent behavior.  Id. at 680.  In 
addition, the relators subsequently alleged that Custer Battles committed fraud in the inducement 
in their airport contract with the CPA by failing to provide a consistent number of security 
personnel at the Baghdad International Airport.  United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, 
LLC (DRC III), 472 F. Supp. 2d 787, 788 (E.D. Va. 2007), aff’d, 562 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2009).      
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
limited the relator‘s claims on the ICE contract to $3 million because it 
concluded that payment requests taken out of DFI funds did not constitute a 
claim under the FCA.25  Employing a source-of-funds analysis,26 the court 
evaluated whether the specific type of funds paid to Custer Battles 
constituted a claim.27  It first found that only the $3 million advance was 
drawn from ―Seized Funds,‖ or legally confiscated Iraqi funds that later 
became U.S. property; moreover, the remaining $12 million in invoices 
were paid out of the DFI, which constituted Iraqi funds.28  Second, the court 
determined that the United States did not ―provide‖ funds to Custer Battles 
because the United States had relinquished control of the funds that were 
previously Vested Funds, or U.S. property, when they were transferred to 
the DFI.29  Therefore, these prior Vested Funds of the DFI ceased to remain 
U.S. property.30  Since they now constituted Iraqi funds, even if the CPA, 
as a U.S. or non-U.S. instrumentality, administered or held them, the court 
reasoned that they did not qualify as U.S. funds under the FCA.31  
In a subsequent ruling, the district court granted Custer Battles‘s 
Federal Civil Procedure Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law 
based on its finding that under Section 3729(a)(1), the relators failed to 
prove that Custer Battles‘s invoices were presented to U.S. government 
officials.32  Thus, in addition to its previous ruling that the DFI constituted 
 
 25. DRC I, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 647.   
 26. Id. at 623.  The court considered the various ―funding sources‖ used to maintain and 
support the CPA as ―dispositive clues to the FCA question.‖  Id.    
 27. Id. at 641.  
 28. Id. at 647.  Relying on the Hague Regulations, the district court explained that Seized 
Funds included ―Iraqi state-owned cash and other movable property‖ that U.S. and Coalition 
troops had previously seized.  Id. at 644.  Conversely, the U.N. Security Council created the DFI 
as a depository to hold proceeds from the sale of Iraqi national resources, as well as for 
―repatriated Iraqi funds‖ that U.N. member states had seized and returned to Iraq.  Id. at 645.  In 
its brief supporting the relators, the U.S. Government further explained that the ―funds in the DFI 
have always been Iraqi funds‖ and never constituted U.S. property.  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Brief of the United States in Response to the Court‘s Invitation of Dec. 21, 
2004, DRC I, 376 F. Supp. 2d 617 (No. CV-04-199 A)).   
 29. Id. at 646.  Despite this limitation, the court nonetheless acknowledged that since $3 
million of the contract were paid with Seized Funds, or U.S. funds that remained U.S. property, 
defendants had failed to prove that there was no FCA ―claim.‖  Id. at 647.  President Bush, in 
accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (―IEEPA‖), had issued 
executive orders confiscating Iraqi funds within U.S. jurisdictions.  Id. at 624.       
 30. Id. at 646. 
 31. Id.      
 32. United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC (DRC II), 444 F. Supp. 2d 678, 689 
(E.D. Va. 2006), rev’d, 562 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2009).  The judge originally deferred the ruling on 
the defendants‘ Rule 50(a) motion.  Id. at 681.  The court initially submitted the case to the jury, 
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Iraqi funds and were therefore inapplicable to the FCA,33 the court reasoned 
that U.S. contracting officers were not acting in an official U.S. capacity 
because the CPA was not a U.S. instrumentality.34  Although most CPA 
personnel were U.S. government employees, the court dismissed the CPA 
as a U.S. instrumentality because it did not remain under the exclusive 
control of the U.S. government.35  Rather, the CPA constituted ―a wholly 
distinct entity that exercise[d] power through a structure agreed to by its 
member states.‖36  
On appeal, the relators claimed that the district court ruled erroneously 
in two ways: (1) by using a ―source-of-funds analysis‖ to limit damages on 
the ICE contract, and (2) by concluding that the relators had failed to prove 
that Custer Battles presented false claims to the U.S. Government.37  The 
relators subsequently appealed to the Fourth Circuit.38  
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A tension between judicial adherence to precedent and modern FCA 
interpretation has evolved as the U.S. Government remains a prominent 
provider of domestic and international funds.  While historically the FCA 
did not apply to claims involving non-U.S. funds simply administered by 
the United States or held in U.S. possession or custody, recently approved 
FCA amendments now permit liability for claims involving such funds.39  
Moreover, while in the past courts closely scrutinized whether an entity 
constituted a U.S. instrumentality in order to satisfy the FCA‘s requirement 
of direct presentment to the U.S. Government, new FCA amendments no 
longer mandate presentment.40  Finally, while courts historically promoted 
the FCA‘s legislative intent of providing restitution to the U.S. Government 
 
who found in favor of the relators on all counts, including that the defendants had knowingly 
presented false claims and records.  Id.  The jury found the defendants jointly and severally liable 
for $3 million in damages, based on the $3 million advance they received on the ICE contract.  Id.  
The relators subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the jury‘s verdict in addition to judgment 
as a matter of law under Rule 50(b).  Id. at 682.  
 33. DRC I, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 646. 
 34. DRC II, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 689. 
 35. Id.          
 36. Id.  Moreover, the court held that under § 3729(a)(2), there was an implied requirement to 
present the false records to the U.S. Government.  Id. at 685.   
 37. United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC (DRC IV), 562 F.3d 295, 301 (4th 
Cir. 2009).  
 38. Id. at 297.   
 39. See infra Part II.A.  
 40. See infra Part II.B. 
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where it suffered extensive financial detriment, recent FCA amendments 
have left the door open to a revised interpretation of ―restitution‖ in the 
FCA context.41   
A.  While the FCA Was Historically Inapplicable to Non-U.S. Funds, 
Recent Amendments Permit Non-U.S. Funds to Apply in the FCA 
Context  
When the Fourth Circuit ruled on Custer Battles, the FCA imposed 
liability on any individual who ―knowingly present[ed], or cause[d] to be 
presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government or a 
member of the Armed Forces of the United States a false or fraudulent 
claim for payment or approval,‖42 or on any individual who ―knowingly 
[made], use[d], or cause[d] to be made or used, a false record or statement 
to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government.‖43  
The FCA defined a claim as ―any request or demand, whether under a 
contract or otherwise, for money or property which is made to a contractor, 
grantee, or other recipient if the United States Government provides any 
portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded.‖44  
However, recent May 2009 amendments altered standards for FCA liability, 
thereby illuminating and distinguishing the legal background from which 
Custer Battles was originally decided.45  In particular, non-U.S. funds are 
now applicable under the FCA.46   
Under the FCA, the U.S. Department of Justice may file suit to collect 
damages for fraudulent claims involving the expenditure of U.S. Treasury 
funds on behalf of the federal government.47  Alternatively, a private relator 
may bring a civil qui tam action under the FCA on behalf of the U.S. 
Government and in its own name.48  Consequently, the relator may receive 
 
 41. See infra Part II.C. 
 42. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006). 
 43. Id. § 3729(a)(2).   
 44. Id. § 3729(c).   
 45. See infra Part II.A.2.  
 46. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 47. Hutchins v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 48. Id. at 181–82; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (―A person may bring a civil action for a 
violation of section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government.‖); BLACK‘S LAW 
DICTIONARY 588 (3d pocket ed. 2006) (defining a qui tam action as ―[a]n action brought under a 
statute that allows a private person to sue for a penalty, part of which the government or some 
specified public institution will receive‖).  The term ―qui tam‖ is short for ―qui tam pro domino 
rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,‖ a Latin phrase that is translated as one ―‗who 
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between fifteen to thirty percent of the share of any possible Government 
recovery.49  The relator‘s qui tam complaint is filed under seal and the U.S. 
Government, upon being served, may choose to intervene and take control 
of the action.50  At the time of the Custer Battles ruling, if the relator 
prevailed, then the U.S. Government was entitled to receive double 
damages from the contractor responsible and could also recover $2000 for 
each false claim submitted.51   
1.  The FCA Historically Imposed Liability on Individuals Who 
Submitted False Claims that Implicated the Payment of U.S. 
Funds, but Did Not Impose Liability on Claims Related to Non-
U.S. Funds Simply Administered by the United States or Held in 
U.S. Possession or Custody 
The success of a relator‘s FCA claim historically was contingent on a 
showing that U.S. funds were directly implicated.52  The FCA‘s legislative 
history indicates that the FCA sought to protect the Federal Treasury,53 and 
that ―the objective of Congress was broadly to protect the funds and 
property of the Government from fraudulent claims.‖54  Honoring 
legislative intent, in 1926 in United States v. Cohn,55 the Supreme Court 
considered whether the FCA applied to false claims submitted to U.S. 
customs officials, who held in custody cigars owned by a third party in the 
Philippines.56  The Court held that a FCA claim cannot include a demand 
for property in which ―the Government makes no claim, and which is 
merely in the temporary possession of an agent of the Government for 
delivery to the person who may be entitled to its possession.‖57  In light of 
 
pursues this action on our Lord the King‘s behalf as well as his own.‘‖  Vt. Agency of Natural 
Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000).            
 49. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)–(2).  The new FCA amendments did not alter the percentage of 
the award that relators are eligible to receive.  See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d) (West 2009).  The 
relator‘s award is calculated based on the level of contribution he makes to the prosecution as well 
as whether the U.S. Government joins in pursuing the claim.  Id.         
 50. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(b)(2), (b)(4).   
 51. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273.  
 52. See United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339, 345–46 (1926).   
 53. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5269.   
 54. Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592 (1958). 
 55. 270 U.S. 339. 
 56. Id. at 343–45. 
 57. Id. at 346.  Although Cohn involved an earlier version of the FCA, subsequent courts 
continued to apply the U.S. custodian principle in requiring the U.S. Treasury to either actually 
suffer or potentially suffer a financial loss.  See, e.g., United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 
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Cohn, it was therefore insufficient for the United States simply to act as a 
custodian or bailee for another individual‘s or entity‘s money or property.58   
Throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first century, the existence 
of U.S. funds has remained dispositive in implicating fraudulent claims that 
satisfied the FCA.59  In fact, a successful FCA claim was contingent on ―a 
call upon the government fisc . . . for liability to attach.‖60  In 1943 in 
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,61 the Supreme Court considered a 
FCA claim involving fraudulent contracts with local government entities 
who received a ―large portion‖ of federal funding from the Federal Public 
Works Administrator, a U.S. official.62  In finding the FCA applicable, the 
Court weighed numerous factors clearly demonstrating that contractors had 
submitted fraudulent claims to recipients of federal funding.63  These 
factors included the stipulation of U.S. Government involvement and the 
applicability of federal law prohibiting fraudulent claims on the Public 
Works Administrator forms as well as the fact that the contract work was 
subject to ―constant federal supervision.‖64  The totality of factors therefore 
indicated that contractors were fully notified that federal funds were 
implicated and involved.65   
In 1958 in United States v. McNinch,66 the Supreme Court implicitly 
upheld the Cohn rule requiring that FCA claims implicate U.S. funds when 
it held that a fraudulent loan application to the Federal Housing 
Administration (―FHA‖) did not constitute a FCA claim because the FHA, 
as a U.S. instrumentality, ―disburse[d] no funds nor d[id] it otherwise suffer 
immediate financial detriment.‖67  Thus, because there was no such 
disbursement, the FCA‘s goal ―to stop [the] plundering of the public 
treasury‖ was simply inapplicable.68   
 
228, 230–31 (1968) (noting that Cohn was decided under a prior statute, yet still acknowledging 
its general principle that the FCA did not apply where the United States acted only as bailee).      
 58. Cohn, 270 U.S. at 346.  
 59. See infra notes 60–73 and accompanying text. 
 60. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 (4th Cir. 1999).    
 61. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).  
 62. Id. at 542–43.  This judicial assessment of the actual amount of funding contributed by the 
U.S. Government becomes even more noteworthy in later cases.  See infra Part II.C.1. 
 63. Hess, 317 U.S. at 542–43. 
 64. Id. at 543.   
 65. Id. at 542–44. 
 66. 356 U.S. 595 (1958).  
 67. Id. at 598–99.   
 68. Id. at 599.   
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Later, in 1968, in United States v. Neifert-White,69 the Court 
determined that false invoices submitted to the Commodity Credit 
Corporation (―CCC‖) constituted a FCA claim, and reiterated that unlike in 
Cohn, here the U.S. Government was forced ―to part with its [own] money 
or property.‖70  Finally, in the recent 2008 case Allison Engine Co. v. 
United States ex rel. Sanders,71 the Supreme Court considered a relator‘s 
claim where U.S. Department of Navy subcontractors allegedly submitted 
false statements, or certificates of conformance, regarding the fulfillment of 
specifications under a contract for building Navy destroyers.72  In finding 
that Section 3729(a)(2) of the FCA, which pertains to false records or 
statements, requires that ―[the] defendant must intend that the Government 
itself pay the claim‖ and ―not . . . another entity,‖ the Court implicitly 
acknowledged that U.S. funds were necessary in a FCA claim.73  
2.  FCA Liability No Longer Requires that the United States Holds 
Title to the Funds Implicated in the Claim   
A little more than one month after the Fourth Circuit issued its 
decision in Custer Battles, Congress passed the Fraud Enforcement and 
Recovery Act (―FERA‖) in the aftermath of the global mortgage and 
financial crisis.74  Overriding the multiple decades of precedent noted 
above, Congress changed the definition of a FCA claim to ―any request or 
demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property and 
whether or not the United States has title to the money or property.‖75  
Under the revised statute, the U.S. Government no longer needs to hold title 
to the implicated funds; rather, the FCA can include funds for which the 
U.S. Government merely acts as a custodian or administrator of another 
entity‘s funds.76   
 
 69. 390 U.S. 228 (1968). 
 70. Id. at 230–33.   
 71. 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008). 
 72. Id at 2127.   
 73. Id. at 2128–29.  The Court concluded that under § 3729(a)(2), the defendant must make ―a 
false record or statement for the purpose of getting ‗a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved 
by the Government.‘‖  Id. at 2130 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2)).  The intent must not be just to 
target claims paid using U.S. funds, but actually to intend the U.S. Government itself to rely on 
the false statement in paying or approving the claim.  Id.   
 74. See S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 1 (2009) (explaining the need to improve enforcement and 
recovery against fraud). 
 75. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(2)(A) (West 2009). 
 76. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 12–13.  In addition, technically under the new statutory language, 
FCA liability can now apply to defendants who merely present false or fraudulent claims to a U.S. 
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According to the 2009 Senate Report on FERA, this revision was 
essential as ―[f]alse claims made against Government-administered funds 
harm the ultimate goals and U.S. interests and reflect negatively on the 
United States.‖77  Moreover, the Senate opined that FCA applicability to 
government-administered funds was ―to ensure that the bad acts of 
contractors do not harm the foreign policy goals or other objectives of the 
Government.‖78  Thus, although it remains to be seen how courts will 
interpret this new definition, it is possible that they may now interpret the 
FCA claim provision in light of this legislative history.   
B.  While Courts Historically Employed an Instrumentality Test in 
Assessing the Presentment Requirement, Recent FCA Amendments 
Eliminate the Need for Presentment to the U.S. Government 
As FCA litigation continued in the modern era of increased federal 
funding,79 courts determined whether and how a federal recipient could 
constitute a U.S. instrumentality in order to satisfy the presentment 
requirement of Section 3729(a)(1).80  Under this provision, an individual 
 
official, regardless of whether the U.S. has title to the funds, and regardless of whether the U.S. 
Government has ever provided a portion of the funds.  Currently, a claim is defined in full as: 
any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property 
and whether or not the United States has title to the money or property, that—(i) is 
presented to an officer, employee, or agent of the United States; or (ii) is made to a 
contractor, grantee, or other recipient, if the money or property is to be spent or used on 
the Government‘s behalf or to advance a Government program or interest, and if the 
United States Government—(I) provides or has provided any portion of the money or 
property requested or demanded;  or (II) will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or 
other recipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested or 
demanded . . . . 
31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).  The choice of the word ―or‖ between 
subsections (i) and (ii) indicates the possibility that the U.S. Government may never need 
to have provided money for the claim if someone simply presents the claim to a 
U.S. official.  
 77. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 12.   
 78. Id. at 12–13.   
 79. See The False Claims Act Correction Act (S. 2041): Strengthening the Government’s 
Most Effective Tool Against Fraud for the 21st Century: Hearing on S. 2041 Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 3–4 (2008) [hereinafter The False Claims Correction Act] 
(statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (discussing United States 
ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004), a FCA suit involving Amtrak 
as a recipient of federal funding, and noting that ―grantees [now] get most of the money or a great 
deal of the money from the Government‖).    
 80. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006) (setting forth the presentment requirement).  The 
―presentment‖ requirement derived from the Section‘s statutory language requiring that the 
defendant ―knowingly presents, or causes to be presented . . . a false or fraudulent claim.‖  Id.  
Conversely, § 3729(a)(2) simply held a defendant liable when he ―knowingly [made], use[d], or 
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met the presentment requirement when he knowingly presented to a U.S. 
Government officer or employee a fraudulent claim for approval.81  Thus, if 
a relator could prove that the contractor presented the claim to someone 
employed by a U.S. instrumentality, then FCA liability was applicable as 
the claim was essentially presented to the U.S. Government.82  
Nevertheless, in light of Custer Battles, Congress completely eliminated the 
presentment requirement under FERA.83   
1.  Historically, Courts Employed a Multi-Factor Analysis to Assess 
Whether an Entity Constituted a U.S. Instrumentality  
Prior to the FCA‘s revision, courts employed a multi-factor analysis to 
assess whether an entity constituted a U.S. instrumentality.  In 1958 in 
Rainwater v. United States,84 the Supreme Court, in considering a case in 
which the complaint alleged that the defendants satisfied the presentment 
requirement, determined that the CCC was a U.S. instrumentality under the 
FCA.85  The Court assessed multiple factors in finding that the CCC was a 
U.S. instrumentality, such as the fact that Congress had created the CCC for 
agricultural commodity support, and that the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture had generally supervised and directed the entity.86  In addition, 
the Court considered that congressional appropriation provided all of the 
CCC‘s capital and that all CCC officers and personnel were federal 
employees.87  Finally, it looked at the general purpose of the CCC, which 
was to provide ―an administrative device established by Congress for the 
purpose of carrying out federal farm programs with public funds,‖88 and 
noted that the CCC‘s incorporation statute expressly stated that it was ―an 
‗agency and instrumentality of the United States.‘‖89  Given the totality of 
 
cause[d] to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or 
approved by the Government.‖  Id. § 3729(a)(2).            
 81. Id. § 3729(a)(1). 
 82. See infra Part II.B.1.   
 83. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (West 2009) (imposing liability on anyone who 
―knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or 
approval‖); see also S. REP. NO. 111–10, at 11 (explaining that amended § 3729 no longer 
requires direct presentment for liability to attach); infra Part II.B.2.    
 84. 356 U.S. 590 (1958).   
 85. Id. at 591–92.  
 86. Id. at 591. 
 87. Id.   
 88. Id. at 592. 
 89. Id. at 591 (quoting Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act, 62 Stat. 1070 (1948) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 714–714p (2006))). 
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these factors, the Court confidently affirmed the FCA‘s applicability 
because the CCC was ―wholly owned and closely controlled‖ by the 
Federal Government.90  
In 2004, in United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp. (Totten 
II),91 the D.C. Circuit considered the Rainwater factors in deciding whether 
Amtrak constituted a U.S. instrumentality under the FCA.92  In this case, 
the relator alleged that the contractor had delivered defective railway cars to 
Amtrak, and had submitted invoices to an account that included federal 
funds.93  In concluding that Amtrak was not a U.S. instrumentality, the 
court analyzed Amtrak‘s ―organic statute,‖ which explicitly stated that the 
entity ―‗is not a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States 
Government.‘‖94  In addition to the conflicting language in the CCC statute 
versus the Amtrak statute, the D.C. Circuit further noted that Amtrak lacked 
factors characteristic of a U.S. instrumentality that were present in 
Rainwater, such as the presence of federal employees and complete funding 
from the U.S. Treasury.95  Totten II therefore illustrated that the particular 
analysis employed in Rainwater, although not yielding a positive 
determination in this particular case, remained relevant in modern FCA 
interpretation.   
2.  In Light of Recent Amendments, a FCA Claim No Longer 
Requires Direct Presentment to the U.S. Government 
In May 2009, Congress also amended the FCA by completely 
eliminating the requirement that a defendant directly present false or 
fraudulent claims to the U.S. Government.96  The amended statute now 
states that a person is liable if he ―knowingly presents, or causes to be 
presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval,‖ explicitly 
abolishing the requisite involvement of a U.S. official or employee.97  
 
 90. Id. at 594.  
 91. 380 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004).   
 92. Id. at 491–92.   
 93. Id. at 490.   
 94. Id. at 491 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 24301(a)(3) (2000)).  The court effectively dismissed 
Totten‘s argument that presentment was satisfied because Amtrak was ―a mixed-ownership 
government corporation prior to December 1997‖ and because ―the Government ha[d] continued 
to hold all of Amtrak‘s preferred stock, and ha[d] provided sizeable subsidies to Amtrak.‖  Id.  
The explicit provisions of the statute simply outweighed the other factors present.  Id. at 491–92.   
 95. Id. at 492. 
 96. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (West 2009) (eliminating the requirement of direct 
presentment).   
 97. Id.  
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Simple presentment of a false or fraudulent claim to another subcontractor, 
contractor, or individual will now suffice.98  Indeed, if Totten II had been 
decided under the new amendments, FCA liability would have likely 
attached to the defendant-contractor, since presentment to any recipient of 
federal funds, such as Amtrak, would have sufficed as the entity‘s status is 
no longer relevant.99   
C.  While the FCA’s Original Purpose Was to Provide Restitution to 
the U.S. Government, Recent FCA Amendments Have Left the Door 
Open for Revising the Meaning and Application of “Restitution” in 
the FCA Context 
The FCA historically applied to situations in which there was a need to 
obtain restitution for damage done to the U.S. Government—either directly 
or indirectly through entities that received a significant percentage of 
federal funding, control, or involvement, and that therefore had a close 
nexus between the U.S. Government and the entity.100  Although the FCA 
had its roots in countering fraud in the defense contractor arena, it later 
applied to a variety of arenas, including the Medicare and Medicaid 
contexts.101  Moreover, although courts historically interpreted legislative 
intent for the FCA as providing restitution to the U.S. Government for fraud 
specifically targeting the United States,102 new FCA amendments now call 
the FCA‘s original purpose into question.103   
 
 98. See id. (removing the involvement of a U.S. official or employee from the statute‘s 
language).   
 99. See Totten II, 380 F.3d at 496 (noting that Congress could have ―amend[ed] subsection 
(a)(1) to provide that claims be presented to the Government or a grantee or recipient of 
Government funds[, b]ut Congress did not touch (a)(1) at all‖). 
 100. See United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(noting that FCA liability may not be appropriate where there is not a ―sufficiently close nexus 
between [the U.S. Government and the recipient of federal funds] such that a loss to the former is 
effectively a loss to the latter‖).  In Yesudian, the D.C. Circuit noted such nexus, and thus attached 
FCA liability where the grantee, Howard University, received over eighty percent of its funding 
from the Federal Government and could be inspected by the U.S. Secretary of Education.  Id. at 
739.   
 101. See infra Part II.C.1.   
 102. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 103. See infra Part II.C.2. 
2010] UNITED STATES EX REL. DRC, INC. V. CUSTER BATTLES, LLC 131 
 
 
 
1.  Prior to May 2009, Congress Intended the FCA to Provide 
Restitution for Damage Substantially Linked to and Targeted at 
the U.S. Government 
The original legislative intent of providing restitution to the U.S. 
Government was apparent when Congress initially passed the FCA to 
address severe contract fraud during the American Civil War.104  In 1863, 
Congress enacted the FCA to combat fraud against contractors who 
―submitt[ed] inflated invoices and shipp[ed] faulty goods to the 
government‖ during the Civil War.105  The qui tam provision under the 
FCA therefore assisted the Federal Government by allowing a ―posse of ad 
hoc deputies to uncover and prosecute frauds against the government.‖106  
During World War II, Congress subsequently revised the FCA in another 
wartime context.107   
By the early twentieth century, however, courts applied the FCA 
beyond the defense contracting context.108  As FCA litigation matured, 
courts broadly applied the FCA out of a belief that the Act was ―intended to 
reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might result in financial 
loss to the Government.‖109  For example, in Rainwater, the Court applied 
the FCA in the context of false applications for crop loans to the CCC.110  
Subsequently, in response to judicial decisions that narrowly applied the 
FCA through ―restrictive interpretations of the act‘s liability standard, 
burden of proof, qui tam jurisdiction and other provisions,‖111 Congress 
sought to amend the FCA ―to enhance the Government‘s ability to recover 
losses sustained as a result of fraud against the Government.‖112  Approving 
 
 104. See United States v. Rivera, 55 F.3d 703, 709 (1st Cir. 1995) (―Enacted during the Civil 
War, the FCA‘s specific aim was to clamp down on widespread fraud by government 
contractors . . . .‖).  
 105. Id.   
 106. United States ex rel. Milam v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 961 F.2d 46, 49 
(4th Cir. 1992). 
 107. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 10–12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5275–77 
(discussing defense contractor fraud during the Civil War and World War II, and how Congress 
played the dominant role in combating such fraud through the FCA).    
 108. See, e.g., Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 591–92 (1958) (applying the FCA to 
fraudulent claims against the CCC); see also United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 
233 (1968) (attaching liability again in the context of the CCC and noting the multiple FCA cases 
that involved the corporation); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 539 (1943) 
(applying the FCA in the context of public works projects). 
 109. Neifert-White, 390 U.S. at 232.   
 110. Rainwater, 356 U.S. at 591–92. 
 111. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 4. 
 112. Id. at 1.     
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amendments to the FCA in 1986, Congress expanded the scope of losses 
under the FCA, such as by explicitly permitting the Government to sue 
under the FCA for fraud against federal grantees and U.S. Government fund 
recipients, including states.113  While in the past, courts might have insisted 
that the U.S. Government actually suffer damage, many later cases 
established that the Government need not have suffered actual damage from 
the fraud in order for FCA liability to attach.114  
Despite the FCA‘s expansion, FCA interpretation nonetheless 
remained loyal to its original intent of providing restitution to the U.S. 
Government where there had at least been the potential for damages 
targeted against it.  Given the civil nature of the FCA, in the 1943 case 
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,115 the Supreme Court concluded that 
the purpose of the FCA was not to punish the defendant, but rather ―to 
provide for restitution to the government of money taken from it by 
fraud . . . to make sure that the government would be made completely 
whole.‖116  Later in 1968 in United States v. Neifert-White Co.,117 the Court 
characterized the FCA as ―remedial‖ rather than punitive in nature, with the 
goal to target ―all fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out 
sums of money.‖118  The focus on ―restitution,‖ but only for justifiable 
compensation for the U.S. Government‘s loss of its own money, continued 
 
 113. Id. at 21.  The 1986 amendments stemmed from a heightened awareness of the ―growing 
pervasiveness of fraud‖ committed by U.S. government contractors, due to the increased publicity 
of defense procurement fraud in the 1980s.  Id. at 2.  The 1986 amendments therefore enhanced 
financial and non-financial incentives for private citizens to bring FCA suits on the U.S. 
Government‘s behalf.  Id.   
 114. See, e.g., Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 n.7 (4th Cir. 
1999) (indicating a split in authority and that the Fourth Circuit does not require the U.S. 
Government to suffer actual damages).  In Harrison, the Court explained that under § 3729(c), the 
phrase ―‗any request or demand . . . for money or property‘ where the government provides any 
portion of the [requested] money‖ requires at a minimum that there is a ―a call upon the 
government fisc.‖  Id. at 785 (first alteration in original) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c)); see also 
Kennard v. Comstock Res. Inc., 363 F.3d 1039, 1047 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that ―[t]he 
transmission of funds to the Government is enough; there is no requirement . . . that the 
Government itself suffer a loss‖); Varljen v. Cleveland Gear Co., 250 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 
2001) (―[R]ecovery under the FCA is not dependent upon the government‘s sustaining monetary 
damages.‖).  But see Blusal Meats, Inc. v. United States, 638 F. Supp. 824, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) 
(noting that an element necessary to satisfy a FCA claim is that the Federal Government ―suffered 
damages as the result of the false or fraudulent claim‖).   
 115. 317 U.S. 537 (1943). 
 116. Id. at 551–52.   
 117. 390 U.S. 228 (1968). 
 118. Id. at 233.   
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to permeate FCA cases.119  Later cases, such as the Eighth Circuit‘s 
Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc.,120 emphasized the following even in light 
of a broad interpretation of FCA liability: 
[O]nly those actions by the claimant which have the purpose and 
effect of causing the United States to pay out money it is not 
obligated to pay, or those actions which intentionally deprive the 
United States of money it is lawfully due, are properly considered 
―claims‖ within the meaning of the FCA.121   
In response to the Federal Government‘s pervasive role in funding the 
American economy, courts warned against the potential boundless 
application of the FCA.  In 1958 in United States v. McNinch,122 the 
Supreme Court warned that the FCA was ―not designed to reach every type 
of fraud practiced on the Government.‖123  Later in 1998, in United States 
ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard University,124 the D.C. Circuit noted that FCA 
liability may not attach ―where the grantee‘s federal funds are an 
insubstantial percentage of its total budget.‖125  In addition to emphasizing 
serious fraud in relation to substantial U.S. funding, in the 2002 case United 
States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp. (Totten I),126 the D.C. Circuit 
warned against subjecting contractors to redundant liability in a FCA suit 
for fraud against Amtrak, a recipient of federal funding.127  Given the 
 
 119. See Hutchins v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting 
Hess‘s principle of restitution with regard to the FCA and that consequently ―[i]t was not intended 
to impose liability for every false statement made to the government‖); see also infra note 121 and 
accompanying text. 
 120. 153 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 121. Id. at 677; see also United States v. Lawson, 522 F. Supp. 746, 750 (D.N.J. 1981) (noting 
that ―only actions which have the purpose and effect of causing the Government to pay out money 
are clearly claims within the purpose of the Act‖ (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Silver, 384 F. Supp. 617, 620 (E.D.N.Y. 1974))).  Furthermore, in Hutchins, the 
Third Circuit noted that ―[e]xtending the False Claims Act to reach any false statement made to 
the government, regardless of any impact on the United States Treasury, would appear to 
impermissibly expand standing doctrine.‖  Hutchins, 253 F.3d at 184 n.5.  The Third Circuit 
further held that ―the submission of false claims to the United States government for approval 
which do not or would not cause financial loss to the government are not within the purview of the 
False Claims Act.‖  Id. at 184.    
 122. 356 U.S. 595 (1958). 
 123. Id. at 599.  
 124. 153 F.3d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  
 125. Id. at 738.   
 126. 286 F.3d 542 (D.C. Cir. 2002).   
 127. See id. at 554 (Randolph, J., concurring) (―[S]uppose the plaintiff in this case prevailed.  
The recovery would go to the plaintiff and the federal government.  Amtrak would recover 
nothing. . . .  Presumably, Amtrak would . . . be able to sue the defendants on its own . . . .  The 
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intended remedial and non-punitive nature of the FCA, the D.C. Circuit 
later underscored the danger of automatically attaching liability to any 
institution that had received federal grants in United States ex rel. Totten v. 
Bombardier Corp. (Totten II).128  Subsequently, in Allison Engine Co. v. 
United States ex rel. Sanders,129 the Court refused to impose FCA liability 
under the submission of false records or statements under Section 
3129(a)(2)130 against subcontractors who allegedly presented fraudulent 
invoices to a contractor, even though they were paid out of funds that 
―ultimately came from the Federal Treasury.‖131  Instead, the Court 
reversed and remanded the lower court‘s decision because it concluded that 
Section 3729(a)(2) requires that the defendant ―made a false record or 
statement for the purpose of getting ‗a false or fraudulent claim paid or 
approved by the Government.‘‖132  The Court further warned that 
―[r]ecognizing a cause of action under the FCA for fraud directed at private 
entities [as opposed to the Federal Government itself] would threaten to 
transform the FCA into an all-purpose antifraud statute.‖133 
In addition to judicial warnings, prior to May 2009, legislative history 
emphasized the careful imputation of FCA liability where the U.S. 
Government provided ―significant Federal regulation and involvement‖ to 
federal grantees.134  The 1986 Senate Report to the FCA‘s revisions 
discussed how Medicare and state Medicaid programs constituted the ideal 
situation in which FCA liability applied to state agencies that received 
federal funding.135  In the Medicare context, individuals submit false or 
fraudulent claims to private intermediaries, such as insurance companies, 
 
effect would be a quadruple damage award—Amtrak‘s recovery plus the treble damages awarded 
under the False Claims Act.‖).    
 128. 380 F.3d 488, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (warning against acknowledging direct presentment to 
a federal grantee for three main reasons: (1) there could be the potential of ―quadruple liability‖; 
(2) the possibility of complications involving the scienter requirement; and (3) the Act could 
become ―almost boundless‖).     
 129. 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008). 
 130. Whereas § 3729(a)(1) previously held individuals liable for directly presenting false or 
fraudulent claims to the Federal Government, prior to May 2009, § 3729(a)(2) attached FCA 
liability to one who ―knowingly [made], use[d], or cause[d] to be made or used, a false record or 
statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government.‖  31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(a)(2) (2006).      
 131. Allison Engine, 128 S. Ct. at 2127–31. 
 132. Id. at 2130 (emphasis added) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2)). 
 133. Id. (emphasis added).       
 134. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 22 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5287. 
 135. Id. at 21–22. 
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rather than directly to the federal agency.136  Nevertheless, the Senate 
Report noted that ―false Medicare claims have been uniformly held to be 
within the ambit of the False Claims Act,‖ despite the fact that insurance 
companies actually pay and receive the claims.137   
The Senate Report noted three principal characteristics unique to the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs that may justify this result: (1) after the 
submission of claims, the United States subsequently, rather than initially, 
reimburses insurance companies for Medicare claims; (2) federal funding 
may constitute a significant percentage of state Medicaid funds; and (3) the 
Federal Government can likely have ―‗substantial contacts‘‖ with Medicaid 
programs such that Congress exerts ―extensive Federal regulations and 
control.‖138  Medicare and Medicaid programs therefore constituted the 
primary context in the past where Congress emphasized the application of 
the FCA to state agencies and private intermediaries which the Federal 
Government substantially regulated and controlled.139  
2.  Recent FCA Amendments Have Left the Door Open for Revising 
the Meaning and Application of “Restitution” in the FCA 
Context  
Recent FCA amendments have left the door open for a potential 
expanded interpretation of ―restitution‖ by abolishing direct presentment 
and the intent to defraud the U.S. Government, as well as by expanding the 
definition of a FCA claim.140  Similar to prior FCA revisions, these recent 
amendments arose during a time of heightened federal funding in which 
Congress intended the amendments to ameliorate the recent financial 
crisis.141  Unlike in the past when FCA revisions may have targeted defense 
contractors, Congress opined that revisions were necessary so that the FCA 
could be ―corrected and clarified in order to protect from fraud the Federal 
 
 136. Id. at 21.  
 137. Id.   
 138. Id. at 21–22 (citing and discussing United States ex rel. Davis v. Long‘s Drugs, Inc., 411 
F. Supp. 1144, 1146–47 (S.D. Cal. 1976)).  In Long’s Drugs, the court held that fraudulent claims 
submitted to Medical, California‘s Medicaid program, fell within the ambit of FCA liability 
because the program entailed fifty percent of federal funds and was subject to ―a myriad of federal 
regulations‖ in order to qualify for federal disbursements.  Id.    
 139. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 21–22. 
 140. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), (b)(2) (West 2009) (broadening the reach of 
FCA liability). 
 141. See S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 1–4 (2009) (noting that the FCA must be clarified to protect 
federal assistance and relief from fraud, especially assistance and relief spent in response to the 
current economic crisis).     
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assistance and relief funds expended in response to our current economic 
crisis.‖142  Thus, overruling Allison Engine‘s requirement that under 
Section 3729(a)(2) there must be at least an intent ―to get the Government 
to pay its claim,‖143 the elimination of this intent requirement may strain 
the nexus between federal funding and an actual or potential financial harm 
to the U.S. Government.144  Furthermore, the new definition of a claim as a 
demand for money ―to be spent or used on the Government‘s behalf or to 
advance a Government program or interest,‖ as opposed to requiring the 
U.S. Treasury to actually hold title to the funds, may further expand the 
definition of Federal Government damages.145  Thus, the recent legislative 
history and new statutory language may alter prior case law‘s narrowed 
tailoring of restitution for damage directed at the U.S. Government.   
III.  THE COURT‘S REASONING  
In United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC (DRC IV),146 
the Fourth Circuit issued a decision reversing in part and remanding the 
judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
 
 142. Id. at 4.  
 143. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123, 2130 (2008).    
 144. See S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 12 (noting that unlike the prior intent requirement, ―the 
provision now just extends FCA liability to those who conspire to commit a violation of any 
substantive section of 3729(a)‖).       
 145. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii) (broadening the statutory definition of a ―claim‖).  
To see from a purely statutory standpoint how restitution may be redefined or applied in the FCA 
context, it is necessary to compare in more detail the new and old definitions of a FCA claim.  
Prior to the May 2009 FCA revisions, a claim was limited to include: 
any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property 
which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United States 
Government provides any portion of the money or property which is requested or 
demanded, or if the Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other 
recipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded.   
31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (2006).  A FCA claim is now significantly expanded to include: 
any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property 
and whether or not the United States has title to the money or property, that—(i) is 
presented to an officer, employee, or agent of the United States; or (ii) is made to a 
contractor, grantee, or other recipient, if the money or property is to be spent or used on 
the Government's behalf or to advance a Government program or interest, and if the 
United States Government—(I) provides or has provided any portion of the money or 
property requested or demanded; or (II) will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or 
other recipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested or 
demanded . . . .   
31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(2).     
 146. 562 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2009).  The court issued its decision on April 10, 2009.  Id. at 295.   
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Virginia.147  Reversing the district court‘s finding, the court held that all of 
the false or fraudulent claims presented in the ICE contract qualified under 
the FCA.148  The court reasoned that U.S. Government money funded at 
least a portion of the claims,149 and that a jury could reasonably conclude 
that Custer Battles had presented these false claims to U.S. Government 
officials in compliance with presentment requirements of the FCA.150  
Rejecting the district court‘s source-of-funds analysis for determining what 
constitutes a ―claim,‖ Judge Niemeyer instead relied on a strictly textual 
analysis of the FCA.151  He referred to the FCA‘s definition of a ―claim,‖ 
currently in force at the time, as ―any request or demand . . . for money or 
property which is made to a . . . grantee, or other recipient if the United 
States Government provides any portion of the money or property which is 
requested or demanded.‖152  The court therefore reasoned that ―[s]o long as 
‗any portion‘ of the claim is or will be funded by U.S. money given to the 
grantee,‖ the claim in its entirety qualified under the Act.153  In addition, 
without further elaboration, the court simply concluded that the district 
court had wrongly determined that Iraqi funds held or administered by the 
United States could not constitute a claim.154   
The Fourth Circuit further dismissed the district court‘s finding that 
the U.S. Government needed to maintain control over the funds used to pay 
Custer Battles‘s claims in order for them to remain U.S. property because it 
reasoned that the statutory language reveals that the United States does not 
need to retain control of its funds after giving them to a grantee.155  Thus, 
the court again referenced the Act‘s language, which simply characterizes 
claims as requests ―made to a . . . grantee, or other recipient‖ of U.S. 
funds.156  Since the CPA, as a grantee of U.S. money, paid the claims from 
the DFI, which contained $210 million of U.S. funds, all of the false claims 
 
 147. Id. at 298. 
 148. Id. at 305.   
 149. Id. at 304. 
 150. Id. at 307. 
 151. Id. at 297, 303.  
 152. Id. at 303 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(c) (2006)).   
 153. Id.    
 154. Id. at 303–04.  The court simply quoted United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 
537, 544 (1943), for the proposition that the FCA ―‗does not make the extent of [funds‘] safeguard 
dependent upon the bookkeeping devices used for their distribution.‘‖  DRC IV, 562 F.3d at 304 
(alteration in original) (quoting Hess, 317 U.S. at 544).   
 155. DRC IV, 562 F.3d at 304.     
 156. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c)). 
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qualified under the FCA.157  The court further rejected Custer Battles‘s 
argument that its contractual language specifically stipulating that ―[n]o 
funds, appropriated or other, of any Coalition country are or will be 
obligated under this contract‖ inhibited finding the invoices as ―claims‖ 
under the Act.158  It reasoned that a claim is statutorily defined in terms of 
its provision of U.S. funds, rather than by the contractual obligation of the 
U.S. Government.159   
The Fourth Circuit also overruled the district court‘s requirement that 
the CPA needed to constitute a U.S. instrumentality to satisfy direct 
presentment under Section 3729(a)(1) of the Act.160  Failing to specifically 
address the instrumentality issue, the court instead concluded that the 
plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence by which a jury could conclude 
that U.S. government officials were acting in their official capacity, thereby 
satisfying direct presentment to the Federal Government under Section 
3729(a)(1).161  The evidence sufficiently demonstrated that the U.S. Army 
Contracting Agency hired and paid U.S. Government contracting officers 
and authorized them to administer the ICE contract and to contract on 
behalf of the United States.162  The court reasoned that these contracting 
officers operated in their official capacity as U.S. employees because the 
U.S. Government paid them to spend U.S. tax dollars, to administer Custer 
Battles‘s invoices, and then later to present the invoices to U.S. military 
officers working in the CPA‘s financial office.163  Thus, presentment was 
satisfied because Custer Battles had first and foremost submitted these 
invoices to U.S. contracting officers employed by the U.S. military.164 
 
 157. Id.  This $210 million was U.S. money in that the sum constituted funds seized by the 
U.S. Government from Iraqi bank accounts in addition to U.S. congressionally appropriated funds.  
Id. at 299.    
 158. Id. at 304 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 159. Id.  Custer Battles further claimed on appeal that its invoices did not constitute ―claims‖ 
because the company was not in privity with the U.S. Government.  Id.  The Fourth Circuit also 
dismissed this claim and indicated that the U.S. Supreme Court recently rejected this notion when 
holding that a subcontractor could be liable for submitting a false claim to the principal contractor 
of the United States.  Id. (citing Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 
2123, 2129–30 (2008)).          
 160. Id. at 305–06.   
 161. Id. at 307. 
 162. Id. at 306.   
 163. Id. at 306–07.  The court further explained that after U.S. Government contracting officers 
administered the invoices, they then presented them for approval to consultants, which included a 
contractor hired by the U.S. Agency for International Development as well as members of the U.S. 
military.  Id. at 307.  After their approval, the invoices finally reached U.S. military officers 
assigned to the CPA‘s financial office for payment.  Id.     
 164. Id. at 306.   
2010] UNITED STATES EX REL. DRC, INC. V. CUSTER BATTLES, LLC 139 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, the court dismissed the district court‘s implied 
requirement of presentment under Section 3729(a)(2).165  It reasoned that 
according to the recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Allison Engine Co. v. 
United States ex rel. Sanders,166 Section 3729(a)(2) simply states that the 
false or fraudulent claim must be ―‗paid or approved by the Government,‘‖ 
which is strikingly different from presentment language in Section 
3729(a)(1), and which courts should avoid interpreting differently.167  The 
court ultimately remanded the case, thereby reversing Custer Battles‘s grant 
of judgment as a matter of law as well as the limitation of the relators‘ 
claim for damages from the ICE contract.168   
IV.  ANALYSIS  
In United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, the Fourth 
Circuit foreshadowed the continued expansion of FCA liability by ignoring 
precedent and misinterpreting the original legislative intent of the FCA.169  
The court erroneously held that all false claims presented in the ICE 
contract qualified under the FCA, concluding that (1) at least a portion of 
the DFI was funded by the U.S. Government at some point170 and (2) U.S. 
contracting officers assigned to the CPA remained U.S. Government 
employees acting in their official capacity.171  In so holding, the Fourth 
Circuit ignored precedent by allowing FCA liability to attach to non-U.S. 
funds.172  Moreover, the court failed to properly employ a U.S. 
instrumentality test by overlooking the numerous factors indicating that the 
 
 165. Id. at 308. 
 166. 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008). 
 167. DRC IV, 562 F.3d at 308 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2)).  The court referenced 
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452 (2002), which stated that ―when Congress 
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same 
Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion.‖  DRC IV, 562 F.3d at 307 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
The court further noted that its conclusion parallels the language of § 3729(a)(1),  which ―defines 
liability in terms of the person to whom the claim is presented,‖ whereas § 3729(a)(2) defines it 
based on the ―intended source of the payment or approval‖ without a presentment requirement.  
Id.        
 168. DRC IV, 562 F.3d at 309.  The court also upheld the district court‘s prior ruling that 
Custer Battles had not committed fraud in the inducement on its Airport Contract because it was a 
fixed price contract that did not stipulate the provision of 138 security personnel.  Id. at 308–09.    
 169. See infra Part IV.A–C. 
 170. DRC IV, 562 F.3d at 304–05. 
 171. Id. at 307.   
 172. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
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CPA was its own multinational entity.173  Finally, the court distorted the 
FCA‘s purpose of providing restitution to the U.S. Government.174  If the 
Fourth Circuit had sustained the traditional FCA requirements, the court 
would have avoided the promulgation of an alarming expansion of the 
FCA.175  Custer Battles therefore exemplifies the continued expansion of 
the FCA at the price of effectively destroying the vital nexus between the 
U.S. Treasury and the contractor,176 creating limitless liability for 
contractors,177 and eroding the FCA‘s original intent of providing 
restitution, rather than punitive penalties.178  While the detrimental impact 
of Custer Battles and recent amendments remain premature in FCA 
litigation, it will likely lead to an unstable contracting environment where 
there is potentially no end in sight to overarching U.S. Government 
interests.179   
A.  While the Fourth Circuit Ignored Precedent by Attaching FCA 
Liability to Non-U.S. Funds, Recent FCA Amendments Now 
Support Custer Battles by Extending Liability to Funds that the U.S. 
Government Lacks Title to and by Effectively Destroying the Vital 
Nexus Between the U.S. Government and the Contractor  
Ignoring precedent, the Fourth Circuit falsely presumed that FCA 
liability could attach to Iraqi funds from the DFI simply because the United 
States previously provided a mere portion of its funding.180  Consequently, 
the Fourth Circuit‘s ruling created further uncertainty among contractors by 
failing to recognize explicit provisions in the ICE contract regarding the 
obligation of Iraqi funds.181  Finally, in light of Congress‘s promulgation of 
the new FCA amendments, the end result will be even more uncertainty by 
allowing non-U.S. funds to apply to FCA claims and by neglecting to 
provide a clear definition of a ―claim‖ for FCA purposes.182   
 
 
 173. See infra Part IV.B.1.  
 174. See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 175. See infra Part IV.A–C. 
 176. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 177. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 178. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 179. See infra Part IV.A–C. 
 180. See infra Part IV.A.1.   
 181. See infra Part IV.A.1.  
 182. See infra Part IV.A.2.  
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1.  The Fourth Circuit Ignored Precedent by Attaching FCA 
Liability to Non-U.S. Funds 
 
Rather than ignore precedent, the court should have avoided attaching 
FCA liability to non-U.S. funds, including funds that did not directly derive 
from the U.S. Treasury, by carefully considering the historical cases of 
United States v. Cohn183 and United States v. McNinch.184  The court 
would have then realized that similar to the situation in Cohn,185 the U.S. 
Government had no present claim to the DFI because, at most, the CPA 
only had administrative control or possession over DFI funds paid to Custer 
Battles.186  Such administrative control appears evident given that CPA 
officials repeatedly assured contractors that the Iraqi Exchange Contract 
was not a U.S. Government contract and that Coalition member laws did 
not apply to Iraqi funds, including the DFI.187  Moreover, by solely 
considering the definition of a claim under Section 3729(c), which uses the 
word ―provide‖ in the present tense, the court mistakenly concluded that the 
minor U.S. funding originally provided to the DFI in the past constituted a 
FCA claim.188  Instead, the court erroneously overlooked McNinch‘s 
requirement that a FCA claim must ―‗connote[] a demand for [federal] 
money or for some transfer of public property,‘‖ or cause the Federal 
Government to ―otherwise suffer immediate financial detriment.‖189  Yet, 
because the United States had only provided a portion of funding in the 
past, rather than directly offering the funds from the U.S. Treasury, it could 
 
 183. 270 U.S. 339 (1926).   
 184. 356 U.S. 595 (1958).  
 185. See Cohn, 270 U.S. at 346 (explaining that there is no assertion of a claim upon or against 
the Government where non-dutiable merchandise ―is merely in the temporary possession of an 
agent of the Government for delivery to the person who may be entitled to its possession‖). 
 186. United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC (DRC I), 376 F. Supp. 2d 617, 646 
(E.D. Va. 2005), rev’d, 562 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the CPA only administered 
the DFI, thereby making the fact scenario analogous to that in Cohn).  As will be discussed later, 
however, given that the CPA was not a U.S. instrumentality, the factual scenario is even more 
distinctively attenuated from that in Cohn since an international entity, rather than the U.S. 
Government, was the administrator of Iraqi funds.  See infra Part IV.B.1.   
 187. DRC I, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 630–31.  In fact, a CPA memorandum stated that ―‗Iraqi Funds 
are not subject to the same laws and regulations that apply to funds provided to the [CPA] directly 
from coalitions [sic] governments.‘‖  Id. at 631 (alteration in original) (quoting a CPA 
memorandum).  The company further stated that when it asked to a file a request under the 
Freedom of Information Act, CPA officials told it that the CPA was not a U.S. agency and that 
U.S. laws were inapplicable.  Id. at 630–31.     
 188. See DRC IV, 562 F.3d at 304 (explaining that a claim arises under the FCA where the 
United States ―provided‖ a portion of the money held in the DFI (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 189. McNinch, 356 U.S. at 599 (quoting United States v. Tieger, 234 F.2d 589, 591 (1956)). 
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not have been forced to ―disburse‖ its own funding for purposes of the 
FCA; rather, it was the CPA that immediately surrendered Iraqi funding.190  
The FCA claim should therefore have failed because there was simply not 
―a sufficiently close nexus between [the grantee and the U.S. Government] 
such that a loss to the former [was] effectively a loss to the latter.‖191   
Furthermore, unlike the situation in United States ex rel. Marcus v. 
Hess,192 in which contractors were aware of federal involvement and 
supervision,193 CPA contract provisions and regulations expressly indicated 
that funds of Coalition member countries would never be used in awarding 
CPA contracts.194  By disregarding the explicit provisions regarding the 
ICE contract, the court not only ignored precedent, but likely fueled 
instability and tension in the contracting community by overlooking these 
specific safeguards in the Iraqi contract that may have in fact attracted 
contractors who were willing to provide services in an extremely volatile 
area.195  Thus, even if hypothetically the CPA actually held the funds as a 
U.S. instrumentality, the funds implicated in the contract were Iraqi funds—
and should have been deemed as such—because there was no close nexus 
between the U.S. Government and the CPA given the notice provisions 
explicitly stipulated in the ICE contract.196  Moreover, the disregard of 
 
 190. See DRC I, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 646 (―[L]oss of DFI funds as the result of fraud was 
damage to the property of the Iraqi people.  Accordingly, any demands for payment from the DFI 
were not ‗claims‘ within the meaning of the FCA.‖). 
 191. United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  In 
Yesudian, the D.C. Circuit referenced the legislative history of the 1986 amendments and in 
particular a Senate report, stating that ―a false claim is actionable although the claims or false 
statements were made to a party other than the Government, if the payment thereon would 
ultimately result in a loss to the United States.‖  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting S. 
REP. NO. 99-345, at 10, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5275).  The Yesudian court recognized, 
however, that while the FCA does not actually include this language, the statute may nonetheless 
suggest the need for a ―sufficiently close nexus‖ between effects on the grantee and the U.S. 
Government to impute FCA liability.‖  Id.  
 192. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).   
 193. See id. at 543 (noting that the work in question ―was done under constant federal 
supervision‖). 
 194. DRC I, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 631.   
 195. See generally Brief of Appellees, United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC 
(DRC IV), 562 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-1220) (discussing the expectations that 
contractors had in the ICE contract based on the specific CPA regulations acknowledging that 
only Iraqi funds would be utilized).  
 196. DRC I, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 631.  With explicit regard to § 3729(a)(2) of the FCA, the 
Court in Allison Engine noted the following: 
If a subcontractor or another defendant makes a false statement to a private entity and 
does not intend the Government to rely on that false statement as a condition of 
payment, the statement is not made with the purpose of inducing payment of a false 
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explicit contract provisions not only expands FCA liability in this case, but 
also creates challenges for contractors who cannot be certain that contract 
provisions, which they knowingly read and sign, will be given the utmost 
respect and adherence in courts.197  Rather than erroneously expand FCA 
liability to unknowing contractors who were misled by multiple regulations 
and statements by the CPA that confirmed the sole obligation of Iraqi funds, 
the court should have instead realized that ―a defendant is not answerable 
for anything beyond the natural, ordinary and reasonable consequences of 
his conduct.‖198 
2.  By No Longer Requiring that the U.S. Government Hold Title to 
Funds Implicated in FCA Suits, Custer Battles Facilitated the 
Adoption of Recent FCA Amendments Whose Dramatic 
Redefining of a Claim Effectively Destroy the Vital Nexus 
Between the U.S. Government and the Private Contractor  
Similar to the erroneous reasoning outlined in Custer Battles, 
Congress‘s revision of the definition of a ―claim‖ for FCA purposes will 
continue to effectively destroy any proper boundaries of FCA liability by 
disregarding the necessary nexus between the U.S. Government and the 
contractor.199  Undoubtedly, the new definition of a FCA ―claim‖ greatly 
expands the scope of liability by eliminating the need to implicate funds 
that came directly from the U.S. Treasury as well as by allowing claims to 
attach to any federal funding regardless of how far back it dates.200  In fact, 
Congress was actually motivated to revise the definition of a claim based on 
 
claim ―by the Government.‖  In such a situation, the direct link between the false 
statement and the Government‘s decision to pay or approve a false claim is too 
attenuated to establish liability. 
128 S. Ct. 2123, 2130 (2008). 
While the fraudulent conduct of Custer Battles was indeed wrongful, and the issue of 
§ 3729(a)(2) liability was remanded by the Fourth Circuit in light of Allison Engine, it is important 
to underscore that Custer Battles understood, based on the explicit contract provisions, that it was 
dealing with Iraqi funds and a separate, multinational entity, rather than the U.S. Government.  
See Brief of Appellees, supra note 195, at 32. 
 197. See supra notes 194–196 and accompanying text. 
 198. Allison Engine, 128 S. Ct. at 2130 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Anza v. 
Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 470 (2006)).     
 199. See Gerard E. Wimberly et al., The Presentment Requirement Under the False Claims 
Act: The Impact of Allison Engine & the Fraud Enforcement & Recovery Act of 2009 11 (09-9 
Briefing Papers, 2009) (stating that the National Law Journal reports an expansion in the potential 
liability of companies and institutions that receive federal funds, such as by expanding liability to 
―subcontracts and subgrantees, effectively overruling Allison Engine‖).    
 200. See 31 U.S.C.A. 3729(b)(2) (West 2009) (providing the new expansive definition of a 
FCA ―claim‖). 
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the district court‘s decision in Custer Battles prohibiting the attachment of 
liability to Iraqi funds.201  By eliminating traditional FCA analysis in which 
a court would only apply the FCA to cases where a claim implicated U.S. 
funds, or funds which the U.S. Government holds title to, the overreach of 
the FCA is now strikingly limitless.202  Custer Battles will no longer be the 
―exception‖ to FCA application by awarding damages to the U.S. 
Government, despite the absence of a present nexus between the U.S. 
Government through U.S. funds and the defendant-contractors.203  Instead, 
contractors will likely be wary of entering into particular contracts when 
FCA liability may easily attach to non-U.S. funds.204  For instance, given 
that a claim now includes money spent or used ―on the Government‘s 
behalf or to advance a Government program or interest,‖ there is no end in 
sight to this statute.205  The boundaries of the statute are further clouded 
because the definition of a ―Government interest‖ is unclear.206  Congress‘s 
failure to define what is ―on the Government‘s behalf‖ or ―a Government 
program or interest‖ has effectively upheld the disastrous decision reached 
in Custer Battles.207  What, then, are the limitations, if any, to FCA liability 
 
 201. See Charles R. Ching et al., In-house Counsel Beware: The False Claims Act Might 
Impact Your Business, 27 ACC DOCKET, Nov. 2009, at 56, 64 (noting that Congress completely 
rewrote the FCA‘s definition of a claim as a reactionary solution to the district court‘s decision in 
Custer Battles).   
 202. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(2)(A) (broadly defining a claim without regard to whether the 
U.S. Government has actual title to the money claimed).  
 203. See United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC (DRC IV), 562 F.3d 295, 303–
04 (4th Cir. 2009) (concluding that a FCA claim is valid even if the U.S. Government only 
administers or possesses Iraqi funds, as opposed to U.S. funds).   
 204. See From Bad to Worse: Changes to False Claims Act Increase Risk to Government 
Contractors, HEALTH CARE FRAUD LITIG. REP., Aug. 13, 2009 [hereinafter Bad to Worse] 
(explaining that eliminating the United States‘ need to have title to the money makes ―[t]he 
potential scope of this provision . . . staggering‖).  The commentators suggest that ―any invoice 
submitted by a supplier, vendor or subcontractor to another private government contractor or 
subcontractor could fall under FERA‘s definition of a ‗claim.‘‖  Id.   
 205. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(2) (failing to define a ―Government interest,‖ yet noting that a 
claim may include a situation in which the U.S. Government ―provides or has provided any 
portion of the money or property requested or demanded‖).  Thus, this new definition of a ―claim‖ 
eliminates any sense of a restrictive timeline or scope of applying the FCA, and instead may 
implicate various individuals, including subcontractors and suppliers who could unknowingly be 
held liable for transactions occurring quite some time ago.  See supra note 204.        
 206. See Bad to Worse, supra note 204 (explaining that such ambiguous phrases in the new 
FCA ―will undoubtedly foster extensive litigation‖).   
 207. See Ching et al., supra note 201, at 64 (noting that the way Congress sought to effectively 
overrule the district court‘s decision in Custer Battles was to radically rewrite the definition of a 
―claim‖).  In effect, the Fourth Circuit‘s decision in Custer Battles upheld the idea of promoting a 
―Government interest‖ by concluding that mere U.S. administration or control over another 
country‘s funds nonetheless triggered FCA liability.  DRC IV, 562 F.3d at 303–04.  In fact, it 
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if a financial nexus dependent on U.S. Government funds is no longer 
required?208   
Undoubtedly, the new definition of a ―claim‖ is a wake-up call for 
contractors, who may find themselves in situations remotely similar to 
Custer Battles in which the contractor is unaware—or even intentionally or 
unintentionally misled by those whom he contracts with—that the U.S. 
Government, regardless of not having title to the funds, is involved with the 
funds in the transaction.209  The unawareness of contractors engaging in 
high dollar contracts is a dangerous proposition.  A recent study reported 
that ―nearly 80 percent of business executives from a broad array of 
companies . . . were unfamiliar with the FCA.‖210  Thus, since many 
businesses are unaware of how the FCA works, yet are more likely to be 
subject to the FCA under the recent amendments, contractor ignorance and 
unpreparedness will likely become a major concern and frustration in this 
economy.211  While this new definition may indeed be ―[t]he most-far 
 
seems plausible that the U.S. Government opined that the administration or holding of these Iraqi 
funds was indeed within its interest to do so.  As noted previously, the Fourth Circuit failed to 
explain in detail its rationale for concluding that non-U.S. funds administered or held by the U.S. 
could implicate FCA liability, other than by citing United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 
537, 544 (1943).  See DRC IV, 562 F.3d at 304 (noting the proposition that the FCA ―does not 
make the extent of [funds‘] safeguard dependent upon the bookkeeping devices used for their 
distribution‖).  Yet Hess does not adequately support the Custer Battles decision in this narrow 
respect as it was based on an entirely distinct factual background.  See Hess, 317 U.S. at 543.  
Unlike in Custer Battles, in Hess the contractors were fully aware of constant federal involvement 
and the implication of federal laws.  Id.    
 208. See Bad to Worse, supra note 204 (explaining that now, ―the broad and vague terms of the 
new statute invite any number of novel, tenuous and potentially frivolous theories of FCA 
liability‖).  The newly revised definition of a claim is not only drastic for contractors, but also for 
companies more generally.  See Ching et al., supra note 201, at 57 (noting that companies across 
the board, not just government contractors, may be liable as a result of the financial crisis).  For 
example, some commentators suggest that ―if your company applies for a loan from a bank that 
has received federal bailout funds or is insured by a recipient of such funds, the FCA may now 
apply to the loan transaction and you ignore the FCA at your peril.‖  Id.   
 209. See DRC IV, 562 F.3d at 304 (holding a contractor liable despite contract provisions that 
explicitly denied the obligation of U.S. funds).  Although the Fourth Circuit crafts an extremely 
vague distinction between the ―obligation‖ and ―provision‖ of U.S. funds, it is reasonable that 
Custer Battles, or the average contractor, would not presume, based on this explicit wording, that 
the FCA could therefore be applicable.  See Wimberly et al., supra note 199, at 12 (advising 
government contract attorneys ―to assume that everyone you are doing business with is a potential 
recipient of Government funds‖). 
 210. Robert T. Rhoad & Matthew T. Fornataro, A Gathering Storm: The New False Claims Act 
Amendments and Their Impact on Healthcare Fraud Enforcement, HEALTH LAW., Aug. 2009, at 
14, 14–15.   
 211. See id. at 15 (noting that because many more companies may be implicated in the FCA 
than in the past, ―these entities are also likely ill-equipped to respond if and when potential 
problems arise‖).      
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reaching change in the FCA,‖ commentators suggest that it is unfortunately 
―among the least noticed.‖212   
The drastic changes to the FCA should not be easily overlooked.  
Several commentators suggest that ―[t]he boundless scope of FCA liability 
provided by FERA was surely designed to increase the volume of cases 
while decreasing the average length of each individual case.‖213  Moreover, 
the revised definition of a ―claim‖ for FCA purposes ―will almost certainly 
coerce more early settlements by defendants unable to assume the 
incredible risks posed by an FCA lawsuit.‖214  Therefore, while contractors 
may have thought Custer Battles was appalling, the new FCA amendments 
are likely to be far worse.  
B.  While the Fourth Circuit Neglected to Employ an Instrumentality 
Test to Properly Analyze the Presentment Requirement, Congress’s 
Complementary Eradication of Presentment Now Encourages 
Limitless FCA Liability 
By failing to consider the status of the CPA, the Fourth Circuit in 
Custer Battles improperly concluded that Custer Battles had satisfied the 
FCA‘s presentment requirement.215  Failing to apply Rainwater‘s 
instrumentality analysis, the court instead found that Custer Battles satisfied 
presentment.216  Finally, the recent FCA amendments promulgate the ruling 
of Custer Battles by completely eradicating the presentment requirement, 
thereby eliminating a necessary filter and creating endless liability.217   
1.  By Neglecting to Employ an Instrumentality Test, the Fourth 
Circuit Failed to Consider the CPA as a Recognized 
Multinational Entity 
In reaching its result, the Fourth Circuit ignored the factors employed 
by the Supreme Court in Rainwater v. United States218 to determine 
whether the entity that received the contract constituted a U.S. 
 
 212. Ching et al., supra note 201, at 64. 
 213. Bad to Worse, supra note 204. 
 214. Id.  The commentators further explain that the ―broad and vague terms‖ of the FCA not 
only invite frivolous lawsuits, but ―remove[] many of the pretrial defenses to liability articulated 
by the Supreme Court in Allison Engine.‖  Id. 
 215. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 216. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 217. See infra Part IV.B.2.  
 218. 356 U.S. 590 (1958).  
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instrumentality, and instead performed an oversimplified analysis.219  If the 
Fourth Circuit had carefully considered the Rainwater factors, it would 
have found that unlike the CCC in Rainwater, Congress did not create the 
CPA.
220
  Moreover, distinct from the CCC in Rainwater, Congress did not 
deem the CPA a ―‗wholly owned government corporation,‘‖ nor did the 
CPA receive ―all funds coming and returning to the United States 
Treasury.‖221  In addition, unlike in Rainwater, not all officials of the CPA 
were U.S. employees; thirteen percent of them came from other Coalition 
countries.222  Finally, the specific purpose of the CPA was not, at least 
openly, to promote U.S interests by using the CPA as an ―‗administrative 
device‘‖ like the CCC;223 rather, the CPA‘s purpose was ―to provide 
security, to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid and to eliminate the 
weapons of mass destruction‖ for the sake of Iraqi stability.224   
While the Fourth Circuit focused on whether U.S. officials were 
working under their official capacity based on the officials‘ personal 
perception of their job and duties,225 the court should have also carefully 
considered the origins of the CPA and how it functions according to the 
perspective of its explicit regulations.226  In fact, the United Nations per 
 
 219. United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC (DRC IV), 562 F.3d 295, 306 (4th 
Cir. 2009) (finding that U.S contracting officers were working in an official U.S. capacity without 
considering the CPA‘s characterization); see also Rainwater, 356 U.S. at 591–92 (discussing the 
various factors used to find that the CCC was a U.S. instrumentality).  
 220. United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC (DRC II), 444 F. Supp. 2d 678, 688 
(E.D. Va. 2006), rev‘d, 562 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2009).  Rather, the establishment of the CPA was 
announced by U.S. General Tommy R. Franks in his ―Freedom Message to the Iraqi People.‖  
United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC (DRC I), 376 F. Supp. 2d 617, 620 (E.D. 
Va. 2005).  Not only did Congress not create the CPA, but General Franks‘s message ―was not 
followed by any formal document or order establishing the CPA or defining its legal 
responsibilities.‖  Id.; see also supra note 14.   
 221. Id. (quoting and citing Rainwater, 356 U.S. at 591–92).   
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. (quoting Rainwater, 356 U.S. at 592).   
 224. DRC I, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 620 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S. General 
Tommy R. Franks‘s ―Freedom Message to the Iraqi People‖ from April 16, 2003). 
 225. United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC (DRC IV), 562 F.3d 295, 306–07 
(4th Cir. 2009).  The Fourth Circuit‘s analysis of the personnel‘s official working capacity, which 
can be characterized as a ―person test,‖ rather than the actual character of the entity employing the 
personnel is not only unusual, but would be inapplicable to situations that do not involve U.S. 
government personnel acting simultaneously as employees of a grantee and the U.S. government.  
John T. Boese, Defending False Claims Act Cases: Recent Decisions and Developments, 
available at 
http://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Programs/Materials/Documents/AM09/boese.pdf.    
 226. See generally DRC I, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 621–23 (discussing the CPA‘s creation and entity 
obligations, as well as the U.N. viewpoint of the CPA vis-à-vis U.N. Resolution 1483).  
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U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 recognized the CPA as an entity 
through which the Coalition member countries acted ―as occupying powers 
under unified command‖ and were called ―to promote the welfare of the 
Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory.‖227  Thus, 
as a whole, the CPA appears analogous to Amtrak‘s organic statute in 
United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp. (Totten II),228 which 
specifically negates the entity as a U.S. instrumentality, since here the U.N. 
Security Council Resolution characterized the CPA not as a U.S. 
instrumentality, but rather as a distinct entity under ―unified command.‖229  
Undoubtedly, this unique multinational coalition cannot be reconciled with 
a simple determination that federal employees assigned to the CPA satisfied 
the presentment requirement without actually considering the entity‘s status 
itself.  
In fact, the court‘s decision to include a non-U.S. instrumentality 
within the scope of FCA liability not only disregarded precedent, but may 
likely have been a result of the political pressure to remedy contract fraud in 
Iraq.230  Subsequent to the district court‘s decision in Custer Battles, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on FCA revisions, where the 
Committee‘s harsh critique of Custer Battles emphasized a need to revise 
the Act, particularly because the U.S. Government had spent so many 
federal dollars in Iraq.231  Thus, the Fourth Circuit‘s decision constituted an 
 
 227. S.C. Res. 1483, pmbl. & ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003). 
 228. See 380 F.3d 488, 491 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 229. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 227, pmbl. 
 230. See The False Claims Correction Act, supra note 79, at 2–3.  During this session, 
Chairman Leahy stated the following:  
  In light of the politicization of the Justice Department, many wonder whether it has 
resisted pursuing certain false claims cases for political reasons—most notably those 
involving contracting fraud related to the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. . . .  [T]he 
Justice Department participated in only five settlements involving contracting fraud in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, recovered a mere $16 million—less than two tenths of 1 percent 
of the overall total. . . .   [S]ince 2002, our Government has spent nearly $500 billion on 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and billions of taxpayers‘ dollars have been lost to 
fraud, waste, and abuse.  They ought to be recovering that, not protecting favorite 
contractors or politically connected people who are bilking the taxpayers.   
Id. 
Naturally, one must then wonder if the Justice Department adamantly pursued this unique 
case as a result of political pressure, rather than because the case satisfied the statutory and 
judicial requirements of the FCA at the time.  See Brief of Appellees, supra note 195, at 16 
(noting that the U.S. Government‘s appeal is a novel attempt to make the FCA apply to an 
international body that was not created for the United States‘ benefit).  
 231. See The False Claims Correction Act, supra note 79, at 4 (statement of Sen. Arlen 
Specter, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (―[I]n the Custer Battles case, to deny a claim 
because it was the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, an international entity that got so much 
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unduly harsh blow to contractors by dismantling traditional FCA 
interpretation for a unique international situation in which the United States 
had its hands tied in a volatile region with numerous political and financial 
investments at stake.232  Overall, despite structural similarities between the 
CPA in Custer Battles and Amtrak in Totten II, the Fourth Circuit in Custer 
Battles failed to consider the Rainwater factors, unlike the Totten II 
court,233 and thus reached the opposite result from that in Totten II.234   
While there is certainly a need to combat contract fraud in Iraq, 
particularly where millions of dollars are at stake, failing to apply a proper 
instrumentality test to the CPA, a distinctive international entity, was an 
unfair way of seeking justice in Iraq.235  In fact, these unique types of 
entities that characterize Amtrak and the CPA represent ―less than one-tenth 
of 1 percent of all False Claims Act cases.‖236  Moreover, given that the 
CPA no longer existed at the time Custer Battles was decided, the court 
should have refrained from judicial activism for the sake of a unique 
international situation, rather than with the adverse consequence of 
affecting contractor assurances.237  Given the rarity of FCA cases in which 
U.S. Government personnel may appear to act simultaneously as grantees 
and U.S. government employees, the Fourth Circuit should not have twisted 
FCA interpretations of presentment and U.S. instrumentalities to fit this one 
peculiar case.238   
2.  Complementing Custer Battles’s Disregard for Properly 
Assessing Presentment, Congress’s Complete Eradication of 
 
of the money from the United States, those are really Federal dollars, and there really ought to be 
a way to encourage this kind of action.‖).   
 232. See id. at 8 (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) 
(discussing the large scale investment of the United States in Iraq).   
 233. See Totten II, 380 F.3d at 492 (discussing Rainwater).   
 234. See United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC (DRC IV), 562 F.3d 295, 306–
07 (4th Cir. 2009) (analyzing the presentment requirement, but failing to employ the 
instrumentality test utilized in Rainwater and referenced in Totten II). 
 235. See generally The False Claims Act Correction Act, supra note 79. 
 236. Id. at 31–32 (statement of John T. Boese, Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & 
Jacobson LLP).   
 237. Id. at 32 (warning that Congress should wait to expand and overhaul the FCA ―beyond its 
roots to every aspect of the American economy simply to fix two almost unique cases [Custer 
Battles and Totten II] that the Supreme Court may fix for us‖).   
 238. See Boese, supra note 225 (noting that cases where an individual is both an employee of 
the U.S. government and a grantee are rare, such that ―the Fourth Circuit‘s person test may not 
extend subsection (a)(1) liability in cases that do not involve this unusual circumstance‖ (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
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Presentment to the U.S. Government Now Encourages Limitless 
FCA Liability  
Following Custer Battles‘s distortion of a proper presentment analysis, 
Congress completely eliminated the requirement of presentment to the U.S. 
Government with the consequence of potentially limitless FCA liability.239  
Despite the rarity of an employee potentially wearing ―two hats—that of an 
employee of a grantee and the U.S. government simultaneously,‖240 thus 
making presentment difficult to prove, Congress‘s complete overhaul of the 
requirement now eliminates a vital restraint on the FCA‘s scope.241  While 
in the past the presentment requirement, as well as the other FCA 
provisions, may have effectively acted as a check to prevent the FCA from 
becoming a ―general all-purpose antifraud statute,‖242 there will likely be a 
tsunami of timely and consuming litigation involving the most discrete, 
insular cases of insignificant federal funding attached to grantees who were 
presented with allegedly false or fraudulent claims.243  Without direct 
presentment as a defense, government contract attorneys and the companies 
they represent will essentially have to relearn the statute and prepare for a 
battle in court with fewer defense weapons in their arsenal.244   
C.  While the Fourth Circuit’s Holding in Custer Battles Distorted the 
Purpose of Providing Restitution to the U.S. Government, New 
FCA Amendments Supplement the Detrimental Impact of Custer 
Battles by Further Eroding the Original FCA Intent   
Rather than perform an overly simplified statutory analysis of the 
FCA, the Fourth Circuit should have considered how its holding convoluted 
 
 239. See Bad to Worse, supra note 204 (noting in general ―[t]he boundless scope of FCA 
liability provided by FERA‖).   
 240. Boese, supra note 225.  
 241. See Wimberly et al., supra note 199, at 11 (noting that the FCA expansion will likely lead 
to an increase in FCA suits coupled with the dramatic increase in the number of federal grants due 
to Congress‘s stimulus package).  
 242. Id. at 7. 
 243. See Bad to Worse, supra note 204 (commenting that the new amendments were meant ―to 
increase the volume of cases while decreasing the average length of each individual case‖ with the 
consequence of admitting ―novel, tenuous, and potentially frivolous theories of FCA liability‖).   
 244. See Wimberly et al., supra note 199, at 12 (advising government contract attorneys to 
educate contractors that FCA liability can attach to any situation of misrepresentation in the 
supply chain, and that one should fully document all communications regarding contract 
performance since ―[t]he further down the supply chain your company is, the more likely you will 
not know that the ultimate contract is with the U.S. Government‖).   
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the Act‘s purpose of providing restitution to the U.S. Government.245  By 
attaching FCA liability in this context, the court awarded damages to the 
U.S. Government despite the fact that the Iraqi people, not the U.S. 
Government, suffered the true economic loss.246  While Custer Battles left 
the door open for potential quadruple liability in FCA suits, recent FCA 
amendments solidify this fear by continuing to erode the Act‘s original 
restitutive purpose.247  
1.  The Fourth Circuit’s Holding in Custer Battles Distorted the 
Purpose of Providing Restitution to the U.S. Government 
The court‘s decision distorted the restitutive purpose of the Act 
because it attached FCA liability to Custer Battles despite the fact that the 
company never requested U.S. funds.248  Unlike the Act‘s original purpose 
of combating contract fraud directed against the U.S. Government, 
particularly in the defense contractor context, the court ignored statutory 
intent by applying the FCA ―to a temporary international entity created for 
the benefit of another country.‖249  Moreover, the Fourth Circuit judicially 
revised the FCA by its erroneous interpretation, when it should have instead 
deferred any revisions to Congress.250  As previously noted, legislative 
history reveals that Congress, not the courts, created and subsequently 
revised the FCA during a time of war.251  Instead of rewriting the Act on its 
own for the sake of political satisfaction, the court should have waited for 
Congress to revise the FCA if it believed such alteration was necessary.252   
 
 245. See infra Part IV.C.1.       
 246. See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 247. See infra Part IV.C.1–2. 
 248. See United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC (DRC I), 376 F. Supp. 2d 617, 
631 n.45 (E.D. Va. 2005), rev’d, 562 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that all CPA contracts for 
amounts exceeding $5000 stated the following in regard to the source of funds: ―The obligation 
under this contract is made with Iraqi funds . . . .  No funds, appropriated or other, of any 
Coalition country are or will be obligated under this contract.‖ (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting a CPA memorandum)).  Furthermore, only two to three percent of DFI funds were 
Vested Funds, or former U.S. property.  Id. at 647 n.83.        
 249. Brief of Appellees, supra note 195, at 16. 
 250. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8, 10–12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273, 
5275–77 (discussing defense contracting fraud during the Civil War and World War II and how 
Congress played the dominant role in combating such fraud through its creation and statutory 
revision of the FCA).    
 251. Id. at 10–12. 
 252. See, e.g., id. (reporting that when Congress disapproved of the Supreme Court‘s 1943 
Marcus v. Hess decision regarding the ability of relators to bring in information that they did not 
personally discover, Congress rewrote the statute so that courts could prohibit relators from using 
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Given that the U.S. Government did not suffer any potential or actual 
economic loss, the Fourth Circuit failed to consider the precedential value 
of United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess253 and United States v. Neifert-
White Co.,254 and instead supported a punitive qui tam action where there 
was no need to make the U.S. Government whole.255  Ignoring the unique 
circumstance of Custer Battles operating in Iraq after the recent U.S. 
invasion and creation of the CPA, a recognized international body, the 
Fourth Circuit invariably supported the U.S. Government‘s contention that 
the FCA no longer simply employs a restitutive aim in recovering serious 
damages against the U.S. Government fisc, but may include ―any request 
for money or property from resources ‗in which [the government] has an 
interest.‘‖256  Thus, the court disregarded the traditional notion set forth in 
United States v. McNinch that not every alleged fraud against the U.S. 
Government should be subject to FCA liability.257  The Custer Battles 
ruling therefore reflects a gross, judicial expansion of the FCA beyond its 
original legislative intent.258   
 
information in the U.S. Government‘s possession when bringing a FCA suit, unless the relator was 
in fact the original source).    
 253. 317 U.S. 537 (1943). 
 254. 390 U.S. 228 (1968). 
 255. See Hess, 317 U.S. at 551–52 (concluding that the FCA‘s purpose is ―to provide for 
restitution to the government of money taken from it by fraud . . . to make sure that the 
government would be made completely whole‖); see also Neifert-White, 390 U.S. at 232 (noting 
that the original FCA was meant to target fraud that ―might result in financial loss to the 
Government‖).  As Yesudian opined in dicta, ―there must be a sufficiently close nexus between the 
two such that a loss to the former is effectively a loss to the latter.‖  United States ex rel. Yesudian 
v. Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  There was no true economic loss on the 
part of the U.S. Treasury, however, and thus no nexus, since the DFI received funding from 
multiple sources, not just U.S. funds, including Iraq petroleum profits, surplus funds from the Oil 
for Food Program, and ―international donations and deposits from the United States and other 
countries of Iraqi assets frozen by these countries during the 1990‘s.‖  United States ex rel. DRC, 
Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC (DRC I), 376 F. Supp. 2d 617, 627 n.36 (E.D. Va. 2005), rev’d, 562 
F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing the sources of funding that comprised the DFI).     
 256. DRC I, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 635 n.55 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).  
Interestingly enough, the wording in the Government‘s argument in Custer Battles was tracked in 
the FCA‘s new definition of a ―claim.‖  See 31 U.S.C.A. 3729(b)(2)(ii) (West 2009) (defining a 
claim as including when ―the money or property is to be spent or used on the Government‘s behalf 
or to advance a Government program or interest‖).     
 257. 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958). 
 258. See The False Claims Act Correction Act, supra note 79, at 31 (statement of John T. 
Boese, Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP) (―If you basically make a false 
claim to any person or entity who receives Federal money, if that is your definition, then you are 
expanding the False Claims Act far beyond its roots.  The roots of the False Claims Act are that 
we are out to remedy fraud on the Federal Government.‖).    
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Quadruple liability is one potential effect of dismantling the traditional 
purpose of the FCA by exceeding the scope of restitution.259  As Totten II 
aptly predicted, failing to employ traditional FCA analysis, as the Fourth 
Circuit did in Custer Battles, may encourage a punitive result where ―a 
grantee could presumably bring suit and obtain a recovery for itself, in 
addition to the treble damages the [U.S.] Government and the relator divvy 
up under the Act.‖260  In Custer Battles, the court‘s simplistic finding of 
presentment despite the fact that the defendants had submitted the claims to 
the CPA, a non-U.S. government entity,261 potentially encouraged any 
recipient of federal funds to sue under the FCA to obtain its own personal 
recovery in light of such lax interpretations of the FCA.262  Furthermore, 
without close adherence to the FCA‘s purpose of restitution, Custer Battles 
illustrated that the FCA could be practically boundless by attaching FCA 
liability to any grantee, no matter the amount or connection with the funds, 
as long as the entity has received some federal funding in the distant 
past.263  This redundant liability and strained nexus between the U.S. 
Government and the grantee is certainly not what the FCA originally 
intended when desiring to protect the U.S. Government.264   
 
 259. See United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp. (Totten II), 380 F.3d 488, 496 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004) (noting that altering the FCA interpretation of ―presentment‖ can lead to ―quadruple 
liability‖ and that ―a court‘s attempt to correct a statute can often create new problems‖).    
 260. Id. (discussing this as a possibility if presentment is not strictly applied in the FCA 
context).   
 261. United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC (DRC IV), 562 F.3d 295, 306 (4th 
Cir. 2009). 
 262. See Wimberly et al., supra note 199, at 11 (noting that the Fourth Circuit ―left the door 
open to liability despite that [the claim] was made to an entity other than the U.S. Government‖).  
As the district court aptly noted, even after a decision was reached in the FCA suit, Iraq‘s 
presumed independent claim would in fact result in quadruple liability.  United States ex rel. 
DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC (DRC I), 376 F. Supp. 2d 617, 639 n.62 (E.D. Va. 2005), rev’d, 
562 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2009).     
 263. See Totten II, 380 F.3d at 496 (warning that a loose interpretation of the FCA could lead 
to boundless application of the Act).      
 264. See Hutchins v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting 
United States ex rel. Pogue v. Am. Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507, 1512 (M.D. Tenn. 1996)); 
see also The False Claims Act Correction Act, supra note 79, at 31 (statement of John T. Boese, 
Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP).  Mr. Boese noted the following regarding 
Justice Breyer‘s concerns during oral arguments of a FCA suit:  
Justice Breyer realized something that I think is very important to this entire argument, 
which is, when you talk about Government money because of Government contracts, 
Government grants, and Government programs, Government money is endemic in the 
American economy.  There is virtually no entity that would not have some Government 
money.  And if a fraud on an entity . . . which received some Government money 
becomes a violation of the False Claims Act, there is no end to the statute.      
Id.   
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Unfortunately, the most drastic consequence of the Fourth Circuit‘s 
ruling is that it fails to compensate the actual damaged party, the Iraqi 
people.265  Established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483, the DFI 
was intended to fulfill the economic and humanitarian needs of the Iraqi 
people.266  Custer Battles‘s fraud seriously damaged Iraq, which lost 
funding from its DFI, and yet the Iraqi Government will receive no payment 
or compensation from the FCA suit.267  Consequently, in disregarding the 
warnings of Yesudian and Totten II, the heightened risk of liability will 
likely create contractor uncertainty and may even deter contractors from 
pursuing complex bids particularly where multiple actors are involved.268 
The Fourth Circuit‘s overhaul of the FCA‘s restitutive purpose 
encourages recovery where the U.S. Government provided a small portion 
of funding to a grantee that maintains little or no connection with the U.S. 
Government.269  Unlike the typical Medicare or Medicaid program in 
which the State receives significant federal money and regulation,270 here 
only two to three percent of the DFI that paid Custer Battles originally came 
directly from the U.S. Treasury.271  Moreover, unlike in the Medicare or 
Medicaid context, the U.S. Government did not play any role in 
subsequently reimbursing the contractor for invoices from the DFI.272  
Certainly, such characteristics do not encompass the serious damage that 
Congress intended the FCA to address.   
 
 265. DRC I, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 639 n.62 (noting that if the FCA claim involves Iraqi funds, 
then Iraq is the entity sustaining the damages, not the U.S. Government).  Indeed, Iraq was the 
entity bearing the damages as they were Iraqi funds.  See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 266. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 227, ¶ 14.  Resolution 1483 further directed independent 
public accountants, approved by the International Advisory and Monitoring Board of the DFI, to 
audit the DFI.  Id. ¶ 12. 
 267. DRC I, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 639 n.62. 
 268. See Brief of Appellees, supra note 195, at 13 n.4 (emphasizing that the CPA‘s Standard 
Contract and Grant Procedures only permitted the use of CPA funds, which were defined as Iraqi 
funds, and not U.S. appropriated funds).   
 269. See United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(noting that FCA liability would not likely be appropriate ―where there is little likelihood that any 
of a defendant‘s money actually came from the federal grant, or where there is little continuing 
contact between the grantee and the government once the grant is made‖). 
 270. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 271. DRC I, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 647 n.83. 
 272. United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC (DRC IV), 562 F.3d 295, 299 (4th 
Cir. 2009) (explaining that the CPA was responsible for paying Custer Battles).   
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2.  The New FCA Amendments Supplement the Detrimental Impact 
of Custer Battles and Further Erode the Original FCA Intent of 
Providing Restitution  
In light of politicians‘ criticisms of the district court‘s ruling in Custer 
Battles,273 Congress has gone even further in distorting and confusing the 
Act‘s purpose of restitution through its recent amendments.274  The effect 
has been the strong likelihood of transforming the Act into an ―all-purpose 
antifraud statute,‖ which the Supreme Court has historically been wary to 
endorse.275  While some have argued that the elimination of the 
requirement that a contractor actually intend to defraud the Federal 
Government pursuant to Section 3729(a)(2) was necessary to sustain the 
viability of FCA suits involving Medicare and Medicaid, a relator could 
still win a Medicaid suit, for example, by showing the defendant‘s intent for 
the state Medicaid program to rely on the false statement in order to obtain 
federal reimbursement.276  In fact, relators have done so for decades.277  
Thus, a plaintiff may successfully argue that ―health care providers and 
others submitting a Medicare claim are fully aware that, while they are 
submitting a claim to a contractor, the claims are ultimately paid by 
Medicare.‖278  It is this awareness that therefore honors the traditional 
 
 273. See The False Claims Correction Act, supra note 79, at 4 (statement of Sen. Arlen 
Specter, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (expressing frustration over the district court‘s 
decision in light of the extensive amount of federal money spent in Iraq).  
 274. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006) (requiring presentment to the U.S. Government, 
minimally defining a claim, and implicitly mandating an intent to defraud the U.S. Government by 
―get[ting] a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government‖), with 31 U.S.C.A. 
§ 3729 (West 2009) (eliminating the requirement of presentment to the U.S. Government, 
extensively rewriting the definition of a ―claim,‖ and removing Allison Engine‘s ―intent 
requirement‖).  Indeed, attorney John T. Boese, an FCA expert, noted the great expansion of the 
FCA as well as the fact that the lack of clear language may cause interpretative problems.  Boese, 
supra note 225.  Mr. Boese further quoted Senator Kyle‘s concern that the new FCA amendments 
should not target ―any garden-variety dispute between a general contractor and a subcontractor 
simply because the general receives some federal money.‖  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).     
 275. See Allison Engine Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123, 2130 
(2008) (―Recognizing a cause of action under the FCA for fraud directed at private entities would 
threaten to transform the FCA into an all-purpose antifraud statute.‖).  Part of the reason why the 
Court was wary to adopt such a statute was that it would eliminate the direct link between the U.S. 
Government and the false or fraudulent claim.  Id.   
 276. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT, THE ALLISON ENGINE DECISION, AND 
POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON HEALTHCARE ENFORCEMENT 6 (2008), available at  
http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-10818:1.   
 277. See id. at 2 (reporting that in Fiscal Year 2007, the U.S. Government received $2 billion 
in FCA recovery, and that more than seventy-five percent of the recoveries came from health care 
entities).   
 278. See id. at 5.     
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intent to restitute the U.S. Government for its own financial losses, rather 
than unnecessarily expand the FCA.279   
Moreover, the political pressure surrounding the approval of these 
recent FCA amendments is strikingly dissimilar from the distinctive 
international situation in Custer Battles.  Congress passed these FCA 
amendments during a period of increased federal funding under the 
umbrella of FERA, which itself was designed ―to improve enforcement of 
mortgage fraud, securities and commodities fraud, financial institution 
fraud, and other frauds related to federal assistance and relief programs.‖280  
Fueled by the American people‘s anger and frustration over the Nation‘s 
leading financial institutions, Congress strengthened the long-lasting impact 
of the Custer Battles ruling.281  As some commentators have noted, ―While 
the nominal targets of the recent amendments to the FCA are the financial 
institutions receiving stimulus funds and other federal assistance, the 
traditional defendants in FCA litigation, government contractors, will feel 
the brunt of this sweeping legislation.‖282  While Congress may have 
passed this legislation with the intent to further support the Custer Battles 
ruling as well as to limit the fraudulent character of prominent financial 
institutions, both of these situations are (hopefully) only ephemeral in 
context.  If the FCA amendments are here to stay, there will be no limit to 
targeting government contractors, and hence no limit to expanding the FCA 
into a punitive, all-purpose antifraud statute.283   
V.  CONCLUSION   
In United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, the Fourth 
Circuit erroneously held that all false claims presented in the ICE contract 
 
 279. Unlike in the Medicare or Medicaid context, the situation in Custer Battles is highly 
distinguishable because, despite its poor behavior, Custer Battles was reasonable to believe that 
U.S. funds were not involved.  See supra note 248.  While technically the Fourth Circuit‘s 
decision remanded the issue of § 3729(a)(2) liability with the assumption that Allison Engine 
would control, the recent FCA amendments, if applied retrospectively, may hold Custer Battles 
liable under this provision despite its lack of intent to defraud the U.S. Government since it 
assumed it was ―defrauding‖ the CPA.  See United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC 
(DRC IV), 562 F.3d 295, 308–09 (4th Cir. 2009) (remanding the case to resolve subsequent issues, 
including the liability of Custer Battles under § 3729(a)(2)).       
 280. Wimberley et al., supra note 199, at 6 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).   
 281. See Bad to Worse, supra note 204 (commenting that ―the collapse of the nation‘s 
preeminent financial institutions provided all the ammunition needed for proponents of expansive 
FCA liability‖).   
 282. Id.  
 283. See id. (discussing how ―government contractors . . . now face punitive liability never 
before contemplated by the FCA‖).   
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qualified under the FCA because of the following: (1) the United States 
contributed a portion of the funds held by the DFI,284 and (2) a jury could 
reasonably find that U.S. Government contracting officers assigned to the 
CPA remained U.S. employees acting in their official capacity.285  In so 
holding, the Fourth Circuit disregarded precedent by attaching FCA liability 
to non-U.S. funds.286  By neglecting to employ an instrumentality test, the 
court failed to realize that the CPA, as a non-U.S. instrumentality, was 
incapable of satisfying the FCA‘s presentment requirement.287  
Consequently, the court distorted the restitutive purpose of the FCA.288  If 
the Fourth Circuit had sustained the traditional interpretation and 
applicability of the FCA, the court would have avoided a ruthless expansion 
of the FCA, later approved by Congress‘s provocation from Custer Battles 
to pass the recent FCA amendments.289  The impact of Custer Battles will 
therefore endure in light of Congress‘s destruction of a meaningful nexus 
between the U.S. Government and its contractor,290 the creation of endless 
liability,291 and the erosion of the Act‘s original restitutive intent.292   
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